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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 1967, the latest, and possibly the concluding, round
started in the long struggle to determine the tax status of professional ser-
vice corporations. On that day, in Empey v. United States,' a federal dis-
trict court in Colorado determined that a firm of attorneys organized as a
professional service corporation under the general corporation laws of
Colorado was a "corporation" for federal income tax purposes. Empey
has since been followed, although the rationale has varied from case to
case, in at least nine2 other federal district court cases, and it has been af-
firmed on appeal. In addition, at least two 3 of the other federal district
court cases have been affirmed on appeal.
As a result of the publicity accompanying Empey and the cases that
followed it and the strong desire by taxpayers who provide professional
services to adopt qualified pension and profit-sharing plans and to secure
the other federal income tax benefits available to corporations, a major,
new, and largely unknown, area of the law is about to become a signifi-
cant part of the practice of many attorneys. This area will presumably
be called "professional corporations," and in Ohio will cause to be ranked
alongside corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited part-
nership associations, 4 a relatively new entity called a "professional associa-
tion."
This article will examine the Ohio professional association statute and
compare it with the professional association and professional corporation
Member of the Ohio Bar.
272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd --- F.2d --- (10th Cit. 1969).
2 Williams v. United States, ___ F. Supp. (D.Minn. 1969); Van Epps v. United States,
F. Supp. -_ (D. Ariz. 1969); Smith v. United States, --- F. Supp. (S.D. Fla. 1969);
First National Bank & Trust Company of Tulsa Okla. v. United States, --- F. Supp. (N.D.
Okla. 1969); Cochran v. United States, --- F. Supp. (D.Ariz. 1969); Holden v. United
States, 289 F. Supp. 169 (N.D.Ga. 1968); Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.
Ark. 1968); Kurzner v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.Fla. 1968), aff'd.. F.2d ---
(5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D.Ohio 1968), aff'd. F.2d
--- (6th Cir. 1969).
3 Kurzner v. United States, ___ F.2d --- (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United States,
F.2d --- (6th Cir. 1969).
4 In Ohio and several other states limited partnership associations may be used as an alterna-
tive to professional associations or professional corporations. Although a discussion of limited
partnership associations is beyond the scope of this article, anyone seeking corporate tax treat-
ment for professionals in Ohio should at least weigh the possible uses. For an excellent discus-
sion of the use of limited partnership association see E. R. Schwartz, Limited Partnership Associ-
ation - An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small Business with "Control" Problems?,
20 RUTGERS L. REV. 29 (1965). See also, Giant Auto Parts, Ltd., 13 T.C. 307 (1949).
SOHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1785 (Page 1964).
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statutes in several other mid-western states, in an effort to describe some
of the non-tax aspects of the formation and operation of professional as-
sociations, while at the same time pointing out, and hopefully supplying
some constructive suggestions toward curing, some of the major deficien-
cies in the Ohio statute. This latter point is particularly important, for,
if the underlying premise of this article is correct, many professional as-
sociations are going to be formed, operated, and dissolved during the next
few years. The Ohio legislature appears to have within its reach a unique
opportunity to head off a myriad of unnecessary legal problems caused by
troublesome statutory language. Unless it grasps this opportunity now,
professional associations and their officers, directors, and shareholders may
find themselves confronted with unnecessary and uneconomical problems
for many years.
II. FEDERAL TAx BACKGROUND
The Ohio professional association statute has a history starting long
before its adoption in 1961. For the most part, this history consists of a
protracted disagreement between the United States Treasury Department
and various groups of taxpayers over the meaning of the terms "corpora-
tion" and "association."" The Internal Revenue Code has shed litte light
on this dispute, for it simply provides that "The term 'corporation' in-
dudes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."17
The modern phase of this history probably began in 1935 when the
United States Supreme Court in Morr'issey v. Commissioner8 held that an
unincorporated trust was an "association" taxable as a corporation because
of its resemblance to a corporation. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court
concluded that a corporation had certain characteristics against which an
unincorporated entity could be measured to determine whether it more
nearly resembled a corporation than a partnership or trust.9 A corpora-
tion as well as a partnership has associates, and an object to carry on busi-
ness and divide the gains. A corporation, unlike a partnership, also has
centralized management, continuity of existence, free transferability of in-
terest, and limited liability. Following Morrissey, the Treasury Depart-
ment began to use the "resemblance test" to determine whether an unin-
6 See, B. Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23 TAx L. REV.
1 (1967). See also, B. Bittker, Professional Service Organizations: A Critique of the Literature,
23 TAx L. REv. 429 (1968) (this article contains a bibliography of the major articles on the
income tax treatment of professional corporations). A comment on Professor Bittker's article
is contained in 24 TAx L. REv. 291 (1969) and Professor Bittker's reply is contained in 24
TAX L. REV. 300 (1969).
7 Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7701 (a) (3).
8296 U.S. 344 (1935).
9 Id. at 357: "The inclusion of associations with corporations implies resemblance; but it is
resemblance and not identity. The resemblance points to features distinguishing associations
from partnerships as well as from ordinary trusts."
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corporated organization should be taxed as a partnership, trust, or corpo-
ration.10
For years many taxpayers wanted corporate characteristics, such as
limited liability, but did not want to be treated as corporations for federal
income tax purposes.1 During and shortly after World War II, however,
one large group of taxpayers, roughly characterized as "professionals,"
began to conclude that corporate tax statutes might offer certain advan-
tages. It was during this period that individual tax rates were increased,
and qualified pension and profit-sharing plans came into vogue..2
In the midst of this shifting of positions, in 1954 the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Kintner," held that an unincorporated
group of Montana doctors was an "association" taxable as a corporation.
This result was reached even though corporations were not permitted to
practice medicine in Montana and the association was probably a partner-
ship under Montana law. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument
that it should look to local law to determine the classification of the or-
ganization, and pointed out that the Commissioner's own regulations also
rejected such an approach.Y4
In 1960, after losing one more case,' 5 the Treasury Department issued
the now famous "Kintner Regulations"' 6 in an effort to overcome the
Kintner loss. In addition to requiring that an entity have a majority of
corporate characteristics to be taxed as a corporation, the Regulations also
referred to local law:
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local law which
establishes the tests or standards which will be applied in determining the
classification in which an organization belongs, local law governs in deter-
mining whether the legal relationships which have been established in the
formation of an organization are such that the standards are met. Thus, it
is local law which must be applied in determining such matters as the legal
relationships of the members of the organization among themselves and
with the public at large, and the interests of the members of the organiza-
tion in its assets. 7
This emphasis on local law represented a substantial shift in the gov-
ernment's pre-Kintner position and led or at least contributed to the enact-
ment of professional corporation statutes by the states.' 8 The states were
quite willing to make the necessary "local law." Today, more than thirty
10 See Minn. 4483, XV-2 CtrM. BULL 175 (1936); B. Eaton, note 6 supra, at 5.
"1 The taxpayer in Morrissey exhibited this desire.
12 See B. Eaton, note 6 supra, at 6.
13 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
14 Id. at 423.
15 Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
16 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1 to -11, 1960-2 CUtJM BULL. 409.
17 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1 (c), 1920-2 CuM. BULL. 409, 413.
18 See B. Eaton, note 6 supra, at 8.
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;tates, including Ohio, have some form of professional association or pro-
:essional corporation statute.' 9
After several more years of conflict, and after losing at least one case,2"
he Treasury Department responded to the professional corporation statutes
)y issuing the present Regulations. 2' For more than a decade, the Treasury
Department had attempted to classify all types of unincorporated organi-
rations by applying one test: the test of corporate resemblance, with or
vithout local law. Now, for the first time, it attempted to expand its ap-
roach by applying two tests.22 The general tests were continued for most
:orporations, but new tests were established for professional service organ-
zations.23 In general, the Treasury Department took the position that re-
)ardless of whether or not a professional service organization was incorpo-
:ated under state law, it was inherently different from other corporations
mnd deserved separate and different treatment. The different treatment
)ffered is such that few, if any, professional service organizations could
)e classified as corporations for federal tax purposes.
Today the professional service Regulations appear to be near their end.
n case after case the courts have determined that they are invalid as repre-
;enting an unauthorized exercise of legislative authority by the Treasury
Department 4  Regardless of the ultimate disposition of these cases on
tppeal, it appears that the professional service Regulations have a very
tim future.
III. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION AND PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION STATUTES
The statutes in Ohio25 and the adjoining states of Michigan,. Pennsyl-
rania, 7 Kentucky,2 and IndianaF9 employ at least two different patterns.
they are either self-contained, 0 they set forth in very brief fashion all of
he operative rules, or they are open-ended,3 they set forth a few rules and
hen incorporate by reference that portion of the general corporation
;tatute which is not inconsistent with the professional corporation statute.
19 6 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 1 5943.1973.
2 0 Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
2 1 Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1 and -2 (1965).
22 In 1918 there was a distinction made between regular corporations and "personal service
orporations." For a brief period the latter was taxed as a partnership. Eaton, note 6 supra, at 2.
23 Treas. Reg. §301-7701-2 (h) (1965).
24See, e.g., United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
2 5 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1785 (Page 1964).
2  MCH. CoMP. LAws §§ 450.221 - 450.235 (1964).
27pA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §§ 12601 - 12619 (1962).
2 8 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 247.015 - 274.990 (1963).
2 9 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-4901 - 25-4921 (19--) (medical professional corporations).
30 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 12601 - 12619 (1962).
3 1 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.08 (Page 1964).
[Vol. 30
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
In addition, some of the statutes3 2 refer to the entity created thereunder as
a "corporation" while others,aa including Ohio,4 refer to it as an "associa-
tion." One other major variation is that in some states,35 including Ohio,-"
all professions are included within one statute, whereas in other states3 7
some professions have separate statutes.
While the state legislatures were willing to make "local law" to help
preserve the revenue of their citizens, they were not willing to grant to the
professional corporation all of the characteristics of a general corporation."8
Most states, including Ohio, 9 had a long tradition of preventing corpora-
tions from providing professional services. Although the professional cor-
poration statutes represented a substantial alteration in that tradition, the
alteration was subject to numerous restrictions presumably intended to pro-
tect the public against the possibility of having unlicensed persons provide
professional services, either indirectly by controlling professional corpo-
rations as shareholders or directors, or directly as employees of profes-
sional corporations. The restrictions may also have been intended to pro-
tect the professional shareholder against the stigma which might attach to
professional corporations if they were used by unlicensed and unqualified
persons to provide improper professional services.
In addition to placing narrow limits on the purposes for which a profes-
sional corporation may be formed, most of the statutes also impose qualifi-
cation requirements on the incorporators, shareholders, directors, and offi-
cers, and, in some cases, require the professional corporation to use a desig-
nation which will differentiate it from a general corporation. In an effort
to enforce the statutory requirements, most of the statutes require the pro-
fessional corporation to file an annual report with a state agency.
The one common thread which runs throughout all of the statutes is a
legislative policy of preventing professional corporations from being used
by non-professionals to provide services which the non-professionals would
not otherwise be authorized to provide.
IV. THE OHIO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION STATUTE:
PROBLEMS AND SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
From the first steps of selecting incorporators and determining the cor-
porate purpose through the last steps of providing for the death or retire-
n
2 See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS § 450.222(b) (1964).
3 3 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANNT. tit 15, § 12602 (1962).
3 4 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.01 (B) (Page 1964).
35 See, e.g., MJCH. ComP. LAWS § 450.222 (1964).
36 Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.01 (A) (Page 1964).
37 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-4901 - 25-9421 (1964) Medical Professional Corpo-
rations).
38 See B. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions
and Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. 1 (1961).
39 See, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.03 (Page 1964).
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ment of a shareholder, the Ohio professional association statute is perme-
ated with difficult interpretive problems. With few exceptions, these prob-
lems are created by the restrictions and qualifications which are imposed
upon the professional association and its shareholders, directors, and offi-
cers.
A. Selecting and Retaining Incorporators, Directors, and Officers
One of the very first, and certainly one of the most perfunctory acts in
the formation of a corporation is the selection of incorporators. As in the
case of a general corporation, at least three incorporators are required to
form a professional association.4"
The following provision might be interpreted to require the three incor-
porators to be licensed to practice the profession for which the corporation
is formed: "An individual or group of individuals each of whom is licensed
... to render the same kind of professional service within this state may or-
ganize and become a shareholder, or shareholders, of a professional associa-
tion."'" However, since that provision also authorizes the formation of a
one shareholder corporation, it is hard to believe that the legislature in-
tended to require the one shareholder to find two other licensed profession-
als42 to serve as incorporators. It is more reasonable to believe that the
selection of incorporators in Ohio is so routine that the legislature never
considered them at all and consequently, when it placed restrictions on the
persons who could "organize" a professional association it did not thereby
intend to place restrictions on the incorporators who could "form" the
corporation."
If the Ohio statute is interpreted to require all incorporators to be li-
censed professionals, then the requirement of three incorporators is a sub-
stantial burden for a one or two shareholder professional association. Most
of this burden will be removed if Substitute Senate Bill Number 158, which
is presently before the Ohio legislature, is adopted, for it would reduce the
required number of incorporators from three to one. However, to remove
the remaining uncertainty, it would be appropriate for the legislature to ei-
ther require the one incorporator to be a licensed professional or to specifi-
cally negate that requirement.
Of more substantive concern are the requirements with respect to direc-
tors, for under Ohio law the directors exercise all of the authority of the
40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.08 and § 1701.04 (Page 1964).
41 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.02 (Page 1964).
42 "Licensed professionals" is used in this article for the sake of brevity. In fact, the person
must be "licensed or otherwise legally authorized" to render the same kind of professional service
that the professional association is authorized to render.
43 But see, Vesely, Professional Associations, 13 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 195, 198 (1962).
Is the term "organize" as used in OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.02 (Page 1964) intended to
be broader than the term "form" in § 1701.03 (Page 1964)?
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corporation not otherwise reserved to the shareholders.4 The statute re-
quires the persons who provide professional services on behalf of the asso-
ciation to be licensed professionals." It also requires the shareholders to be
licensed professionals.46 However, as anomalous as it may seem, there is
no requirement that the directors, as such, be licensed professionals.
The use of non-licensed directors would not be permitted in most of the
surrounding states.48 In addition, for some professions the use of non-li-
censed directors would represent a violation of ethical standards.4  Further-
more, such a use might violate some professional licensing statutes, if not in
Ohio, then in adjoining states.50
Once the shareholders of a professional association conclude that they
will use licensed professionals as directors, they are, in the case of the one
or two shareholder association, faced with the difficult problem of finding
other licensed professionals to serve as directors, since the corporation must
have at least three directors."' Given the highly publicized liability expo-
sure of directors of general corporations,52 and the uncertainty surrounding
professional associations, this could present an insurmountable problem for
some professional associations. However, this problem will no longer exist
if Substitute Senate Bill Number 158 is passed, for it would reduce the re-
quired number of directors to the number of shareholders in a one or two
shareholder corporation.
If a director is not, in the first instance, required to be a licensed profes-
sional, it follows that he need not cease to be a director if he loses his li-
cense. Thus, but for ethical standards, or possibly professional licensing re-
quirements, a corporation authorized to practice law (if such a corporation
may be formed in the future) 5 may continue to have on its board of direc-
tors a disbarred attorney or a medical corporation may continue to have on
its board of directors a physician who has lost his license. Moreover, a cor-
poration could provide medical services, again subject to ethical standards
and professional licensing requirements, even though all of its directors
have lost their licenses, provided that it employs licensed persons to carry
out its professional activities.
44 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Page Supp. 1968).
45 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.03 (Page 1964).
46 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.02, § 1785.06, and § 1785.07 (Page 1964).
47 See Vesely, note 43 supra, at 202.
4s See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.035 (1963).
49 ABA FOIMAL OPINION 303 (1961).
Z;0 See, e.g., MICH. CoNIP. LAws § 338.567 (1964).
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.56(A) (Page 1964).
52 "General corporations" refers to corporations formed under OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
1701 (Page 1964).
53At the present time Ohio attorneys may not use professional associations. State ex rel.
Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).
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This problem is solved in Kentucky by the following provision:
No person may be [al . .. director... unless he is and remains duly li-
censed and free from legal disability to render the professional services for
which the corporation was organized.5
A similar requirement seems to be imposed in Michigan55 by the more indi-
rect means of requiring all directors to be shareholders and all shareholders
to be licensed. Indiana carries the Kentucky pattern even further by not
only requiring a director who loses his license to sever his connection with
the corporation,50 but also requiring the corporation to force compliance
with that provision or face the loss of its charter.
It appears that officers who do not perform professional services on be-
half of the association -need not be licensed professionals. 5 Since most cor-
porate officers do not possess the broad corporate authority of directors,
permitting the use of some unlicensed officers does not pose a threat to the
legislative policy underlying the licensing requirements.
Many of the problems with respect to incorporators and directors can be
solved by the adoption of Substitute Senate Bill Number 158, which would
reduce the number of -incorporators to one and reduce to one and two, re-
spectively, the number of directors required in one and two shareholder
corporations. Many of the remaining problems can be solved by requiring,
as in Kentucky,59 that all directors be and remain licensed, and by establish-
ing, as in Indiana,60 mechanics for implementation of the legislative policy.
This would prevent unlicensed persons from serving on the board of direc-
tors and possibly controlling a professional association and would buttress
the legislative policy which is expressed by the requirement that officers
and employees who provide professional services and all shareholders be li-
censed.
On the other hand, there are good reasons to continue to permit unli-
censed persons to hold some offices so long as they are not shareholders or
directors and do not provide professional services. This would permit the
engineering corporation to elect its internal accountant as treasurer or its
house counsel as secretary. However, it would be consistent with the over-
all policy of the statute to add a requirement that any officer who is author-
ized to supervise or control the professional activities of a person who is a
licensed professional must also be a licensed professional."1 This would
54 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.035 (1963).
n5IcH. COMP. LAws § 450.232 and § 450.222(b) (1964).
5 6 ND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4917 (1964) (medical professional corporation).
57Id.
58 See Vesely, supra note 53, at 202. It is not inconceivable that a court might construe OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.03 (Page 1964) to require all officers to be licensed professionals.
5 9 Ky. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 274.035 (1963).
60 IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4917 (1964) (medical professional corporation).
61 It is possible to interpret OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.03 (Page 1964) as already im-
posing such a requirement.
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make it clear that the chief executive officer of a professional association
must be a licensed professional even though he does not directly provide
any professional services.
Finally, one unnecessary problem can be eliminated by requiring the
one incorporator to be a licensed professional or providing specifically that
he need not be a licensed professional, the latter being the more practical
choice.
B. Scope of Activities
A professional association may only be formed for the sole purpose of
rendering a professional service.' Its shareholders must be licensed or
otherwise legally authorized to render the same kind of professional ser-
vice.63
The "one profession" limitation seems to be a fundamental part of the
professional corporation concept.6 For many professions this requirement
echoes the ethical standards or professional licensing requirements other-
wise applicable to a group practice.65
One might question the advisability of trying to superimpose ethical
standards on professionals via a professional association statute. Never-
theless, it must be recognized that this approach is fundamental in most
such statutes, and is not likely to be changed."'
In addition to only providing one professional service, the professional
association may not engage -in unrelated activities: its "sole purpose" must
be to render the professional service. This, of course, raises a number of
questions about the manner in which the professional association utilizes its
funds. May the three shareholder medical association purchase land and
build a one-story office building? May it build a ten-story office building
if it only uses one-half of one floor? May it invest its excess funds in raw
land or in an apartment project?
The general corporation statute gives the professional association very
broad powers in carrying out the purposes stated in its articles. 67 However,
since the purpose of a professional association must be limited to rendering
a professional service, it is not dear what activities the association may prop-
62 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.01 (B) (Page 1964).
63OHIo RE. CODE ANN. § 1785.02 (Page 1964) [immediately prior to publication §
178.01 and 1785.02 were amended to permit architects and professional engineers to join in
professional associations.)
c4 See, e.g., MicH. CoCip. LAWs § 450.222 (1964).
65See, e.g., Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 4703.18(D) (Page Supp. 1968) [immediately prior
to publication this section was amended effective Sept. 23, 1969.)
66 Some states have made an exception to the "one profession" limitation by permitting archi-
tects and engineers to be shareholders in the same corporation. See, e.g., § 5 of the Washington
Professional Service Corporation Act, 7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX REP. II 6628, which be-
comes effective on June 12, 1969 [Ohio added a similar provision to its statute by Amended Sen-
ate Bill 330.)
67 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (F) (Page Supp. 1968).
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erly undertake outside of those activities which specifically relate to render-
ing the professional service.6"
The statutes in some other states contain language which specifically
authorize the professional corporation to invest its funds in certain kinds of
assets. For instance, the Kentucky statute contains the following language:
No professional service corporation organized under this chapter shall en-
gage in any business other than the rendering of the professional service
for which it was specifically incorporated; provided, however, that noth-
ing in this chapter or any other provisions of existing law applicable to
corporations shall be interpreted to prohibit such corporations from invest-
ing its funds in real estate, mortgages, stocks, bonds, or any other type of
investment, or from owning real or personal property necessary for the
rendering of professional services. 69
The original Ohio professional association bill contained language very
much like this but it was deleted prior to enactment."0
While the language in the Kentucky statute is not ideal, it at least an-
swers the questions about investments in real estate, improved or unim-
proved, and provides the professional corporation with some workable
ground rules.
The Ohio statute should be revised to expressly permit the professional
association to make unrelated investments.
C. Limited Liability
In a professional partnership, the partnership is liable for any wrongful
act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the partner-
ship's business or with the authority of his partners71 and the partners are
jointly and severally liable for such obligations of the partnership.72 In a
general corporation, an employee is personally liable for his own negligent
acts or omissions73 and the corporation is frequently also liable for the neg-
ligence of its employees,74 but a shareholder, as such, is not personally
liable for the obligations of the corporation.
Only one section of the professional association statute refers to the lia-
bility of anyone. Section 1785.04 provides:
Sections 1785.01 to 1785.08, inclusive, of the Revised Code, do not
modify any law applicable to the relationship between a person furnish-
ing professional services and a person receiving such services, including
liability arising out of such professional service. 75
68 See Vesely, note 43 supra, at 197.
69 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.115 (1963).
70 Dunkel, Professional Corporations, 22 OHIo S. L. J. 703, 709 (1961).
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.12 (Page 1964).
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.14 (Page 1964).
73 See, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
74 SeeW. PROSSER, TORTS 470 (3rd ed. 1964).
75 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Page 1964).
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The meaning of that language which appears in the statutes of several
states,78 has been subject to vigorous debate. Professor Bittker in an early
article on professional corporations raised the possibility that "person fur-
nishing professional services" might be interpreted broadly to encompass
all of the members or shareholders, with the result that the mutual agency
and resulting mutual liability of partnership law would be applied.77 Other
commentators seem to have concluded that it merely restates the general
rule that a corporate employee is liable for his own negligent acts.71 Still
other commentators have reached intermediate conclusions between these
two extremes. 71 One such intermediate conclusion is that this language pre-
serves "such forms of personal liability as a physician's vicarious liability
for the negligence of assistants under his control and the professional's con-
tract liability for failure to provide a promised result."' Still another sug-
gestion is that the language might result in personal liability to all persons
who participate in furnishing services out of which the tort arises.8 '
The federal district court in O'Neil 82 considered this issue and the
conclusions of commentators on both sides, although not the commentators
in between, and concluded that "the shareholders of Ohio professional as-
sociations have limited liability. '8 3 This seems to be a sound conclusion
if it means that shareholders, as shareholders, have limited liability. How-
ever, the court's reasoning does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a
shareholder-employee of a professional association has the same immunity
from liability that he would have in a general corporation.84
There is no mandatory requirement, legal or ethical that professionals
must always subject themselves to personal liability for the acts of their col-
leagues. For years it has been possible for professionals to receive corpo-
rate-type liability protection by forming an Ohio limited partnership asso-
ciation." This entity has the same general liability features as a general
corporation." In addition, there is nothing inherently unethical or im-
76 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-5109 (1964) (professional corporations).
77 B. Bittker, note 38 supra, at 11.
78 Vesely, note 43 supra, at 203.
7975 HARV. L. REV. 776 (1962).
So Id., at 781.
81 Id.
2 O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd __. F. 2d --- (6th
Cir. 1969).
83 Id., at 362.
84 "Since it is inconceivable that a professional-association statute would be taken to repeal
the professional practitioner's common law liability for torts he personally commits, the qualifica-
tion is mere supererogation unless it saves more than that liability." 75 HARv. L. REV. 776, 781
(1962).
8 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1783 (Page 1964).
8 6 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 1783.08 (Page 1964).
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proper about limiting professional liability, provided that the client is
placed on notice that he is dealing with a corporate entity.s
Most of the statutes in the states surrounding Ohio contain language
similar to that found in the Ohio statute. However, the Michigan statute
contains some interesting additional language:
Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation organized
under this act shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable for
any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct committed by him, or by any
person under his direct supervision and control, while rendering profes-
sional service on behalf of the corporation to the person for whom such
professional services were being rendered. s
This language makes explicit one conclusion reached by the intermediate
interpreters of the Ohio-type statute.8 9
Certainly the Ohio legislature should clarify the language of Section
1785.04 before the litigation starts. The O'Neill conclusion is far too nar-
row to provide any comfort. If the intermediate interpretation is the one
which the Ohio legislature intended, and it does offer an interesting recon-
cilation of the desire to have general corporation limited liability while pro-
tecting the professional-client relationship, then it should be clearly ex-
pressed in the statute. In any event, and regardless of the intended result,
the shareholder-employee must be put in notice of the extent of his per-
sonal liability exposure.
D. Selection of Name
Since the Ohio professional association statute says nothing about the
name to be used, the professional association must follow the general cor-
porate statute which requires its name to end with or include "Company,"
"Co .... .Corporation," "Incorporated," or "Inc."9 In addition, the profes-
sional association must comply with any ethical or licensing requirements
with respect to the use of individual names.91
Other states either permit the professional corporation to select any
name permitted by law or the ethics of the profession, - or require the use
of words which distinguish the professional corporation from other corpo-
rations.°3 Kentucky and Michigan are both in the latter category. Ken-
8 7 See ABA FORMAL OPINION 303 (1961).
8 8 
Mic-. CoMp. LAws § 430.226 (1964).
80 It may have even carried this conclusion one step further. Does the Michigan Statute mean
that a non-shareholder employee is liable for any negligence of a person under his direct super-
vision and control? See, Kurzner v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839, 845 (S.D. Fla. 1968)
afld __. F.2d --- (5th Cir. 1969).
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04 (A) (1) (Page 1964).
91See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4715.18 (Page Supp. 1968). See Vesely, note 43
supra, at 199.
92 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. § 12615 (1962).
93 See, e.g., MICH. LAWS § 450.231 (1964).
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tucky" requires the use of "chartered," "professional service corporation,"
or "P.S.C." and Michigan 5 requires the use of "professional corporation"
or "P.C."
Since there are fundamental differences between a professional associa-
tion and a general corporation, the requirement that a professional associa-
tion identify itself by the words "professional association" or by the initials
"P.A.," may serve some useful purposes. It will put the public on notice
that it may have limited authority outside of the area of its practice. It
will also provide the public with assurances that its shareholders are li-
censed professionals. Moreover, it may offer certain non-legal, psychologi-
cal benefits to the traditionalists who frown on adding "Inc." to their
name.
E. Transfer of Shares: Voluntary and Involuntary
A professional association may only issue its shares to persons who are
licensed to provide the same professional service that the association is au-
thorized to provide."" Once a person becomes a shareholder, he may only
transfer his shares to an individual who is also licensed to provide the same
professional service. 7 A shareholder may not transfer his stock to his chil-
dren, unless they are licensed to provide the same professional service, or to
a trustee of a trust. Also, he may not transfer his shares to another corpo-
ration.
May the professional association purchase or redeem his shares? The
professional association statute is strangely silent on this point, with the re-
sult that one must try to reconcile the statement in the professional associa-
tion statute that a shareholder may only "sell or transfer his shares... to
another individual who is duly licensed. . . ."'s with the provisions of the
general corporate statute authorizing a corporation to purchase 9  or re-
deem'00 its own stock. A literal reading of the professional association
statute would lead one to conclude that the professional association cannot
purchase or redeem its own shares.""' However, this results in such a myr-
iad of problems that a court might feel compelled to find that a redemp-
tion of the shares is not a "sale or transfer" or that the professional associ-
ation section dealing with transfers is simply not intended to deal with
redemptions and purchases by the issuing association. In any event, until
this problem is clarified, the shareholders of a professional association
94 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 274.075 (1963).
95MAficH. COMP. LAws § 450.231 (1964).
06 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.05 (Page 1964).
9 7 OIo Ruv. CODE ANN. § 1785.07 (Page 1964).
98 Id.
0 9 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.35 (Page Supp. 1968).
100 OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.23 (Page 1964).
101 See, 7 CAvrrcii, Omo CORPORATION LAW § 1824 (1968).
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should attempt to avoid this problem by providing in the articles of in-
corporation that the association may redeem or purchase its own shares and
by entering into a buy-sell agreement pursuant to which the association or
the other shareholders are authorized to purchase a shareholder's stock in
certain events, i.e. death, disability, bankruptcy, and loss of license. If the
buy-sell agreement provides for the purchase of a shareholder's stock by
the association, it also ought to provide for a purchase by the other share-
holders if the association is prevented by law from purchasing the shares.
Of course, it makes little sense to continue in force, without change,
a statute that requires a judicial interpretation to reach a result that is al-
most necessitated by its other requirements. Ohio should follow the pattern
of other states, and specifically permit the professional association to pur-
chase or redeem its shares. 10 2
While the statute presents a number of problems for voluntary trans-
fers, at least the shareholder can refrain from making the transfers. How-
ever, there are a number of circumstances in which transfers must be
made, such as the death or disqualification of a shareholder. The statute's
silence on these points raises serious problems.
If the shareholder can only transfer his shares to another individual li-
censed to engage in the same profession, what happens when he dies or be-
comes incompetent? Here one may ask an infinite variety of questions
and arrive at no answers other than to speculate about the probable result
of litigation which is sure to occur. A brief list of some questions should
illustrate this point. In each case assume that no buy-sell agreement exists;
that the remaining shareholders and the family of the deceased shareholder
have a strained relationship; and, to make the illustration as graphic as pos-
sible, that the deceased shareholder owned 51% of the outstanding com-
mon stock.
(i) If the executor of the deceased shareholder's estate requests the cor-
poration to transfer the shares to his name, should the corpora-
tion honor his request?
(ii) What happens if the executor and corporation cannot agree upon a
purchase price for the shares?
(iii) Even if they can agree on a price, can the corporation properly pur-
chase the shares?
(iv) Must the executor be given notice of shareholders' meetings?
(v) May he vote at the meetings?
(vi) Is he entitled to receive dividends on the shares?
Other states -have tried to answer these questions by employing a num-
ber of different statutory schemes; some quite simple, others quite elabo-
rate. Michigan takes the most direct and relatively simple approach.
No shares of a corporation organized under this act shall be sold or trans-
ferred except to an individual who is eligible to be a shareholder of such
102 See, e.g., MiCH CoMp. LAws § 450.230 (1964).
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corporation or to the personal representative or estate of a deceased or
legally incompetent shareholder. The personal representative or estate of
such shareholder may continue to own such shares for a reasonable period
but shall not be authorized to participate in any decisions concerning the
rendering of professional service. The articles of incorporation or bylaws
may provide specifically for additional restrictions on the transfer of shares
and may provide for the redemption or purchase of such shares by the
corporation or its shareholders at prices and in a manner specifically set
forth. The provisions dealing with the purchase or redemption by the
corporation of its shares may not be invoked at a time or in a manner that
would impair the capital of the corporation.' 03
This provision certainly answers a number of questions, although it is
vague about the right of the executor to vote at shareholders' meetings,
particularly with respect to the election of directors, and it does not estab-
lish procedures for handling the situation where the parties are unable to
agree on a price.
The Indiana statute does not seem to deal adequately with the role of
the executor prior to the sale, but, if the parties have not otherwise agreed
upon a sales procedure, it requires a sale at book value within 90 days after
the shareholder's death."°4 While this provides great simplicity and cer-
tainty, book value is highly arbitrary and seldom reflects market value in
a personal service enterprise. 15
The Kentucky statute establishes a very elaborate procedure that re-
quires the parties to bring an equitable action for a determination of the
fair market value of the shares if they are otherwise unable to agree. 06
It also sets up an appraisal procedure. It insures compliance by providing
for loss of the corporate charter if the parties are unable to agree and the
corporation fails to bring the equitable action. °7
Ohio might well borrow some statutory language from the adjoining
states, and improve on it a bit, to head off the many problems associated
with the death or incompetency of a shareholder. Like Michigan, 08 Ohio
should have a provision giving to the personal representative of the de-
ceased or incompetent shareholder an interim status. It would be best to
treat the personal representative as a passive investor, much like a non-
voting preferred shareholder or a limited partner, during the interim
period. He should not be permitted to vote for directors or on routine
matters but he should be entitled to receive notice of shareholder meetings
and to vote on those fundamental changes in the corporate structure
which affect his investment, such as a merger.
103 Id.
10 4 IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4918 (19--) (medical professional corporation).
105 Cf., Rev Rule 59-60, 1959-1 Cure. Bull. 237.
100 Ky. REy. STAT. ANN. § 274.095 (Supp. 1968).
107 Id.
10s8flc. CoMP. LAws § 450.230 (1964).
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Then, like Kentucky, 10 9 a time limit might be established for the sale
to take place. The parties might be permitted to voluntarily extend the
time limit by two or three years, so that, in an appropriate case, the de-
ceased shareholder's estate could delay the sale until after the value of the
stock is determined for Ohio or federal estate tax purposes. Since the per-
sonal representative would be treated as a passive investor, an extension
by agreement would not unduly conflict with the policy of prohibiting
non-licensed persons from being shareholders." 0
If the parties were unable to agree upon the terms of sale within the
prescribed time, then a modified Kentucky procedure should be applied.
The parties should be required to go to court, but, unlike Kentucky, where
the court appoints an appraiser,"' the parties should be required to use an
arbitration-type technique of each appointing an appraiser, and having the
two appraisers appoint a third appraiser. If the two appraisers could not
agree on the selection of a third appraiser or if other disagreements should
arise, then the court could intervene and appoint a third appraiser or re-
solve the dispute. If any two of the three appraisers could agree on a
price, their determination would be binding on the parties. If they could
not agree, then the determination of the third appraiser would be bind-
ing on the parties. To aid this procedure, the statute might establish cer-
tain fundamental valuation principles to give the appraisers some frame of
reference.
Finally, like Kentucky, 112 Ohio should impose sanctions, so if the par-
ties are unable to agree, the corporation will be required, at the risk of
losing its charter, to bring the appropriate action.
Many of the same problems arise when a shareholder loses his license.
Unlike the statutes in some other states,113 the Ohio professional associa-
tion statute does not expressly require each shareholder to continue to be
licensed nor does it establish any procedure by which he is to divest him-
self of his shares. The only section of the statute which seems to deal
with this problem is the section which requires the president and secretary
of the professional association to file a report each year with the Ohio
Secretary of State in which they certify that all shareholders are "duly
licensed or otherwise legally authorized" to provide professional services
in Ohio." 4 Since nothing is said about the consequences of not filing the
report, presumably nothing will happen unless the state or one of the as-
109 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.095 (Supp. 1968).
110 It might raise some fee-splitting problems, but this will always be true for some period
of time in a professional association.
"'l KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 274.095 (Supp. 1968).
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.035 (1963).
1"4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.06 (Page 1964).
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sociation's shareholders or directors institutes a lawsuit." 5 Then, of course,
the court would be faced with solving the same type of problem posed by
the death or incompetency of a shareholder, with little if any legislative
guidance.
Most other states have tried to solve this problem by applying the same
rules to a shareholder disqualification as to his death.'- 6 Ohio could also
take this approach, although it should substantially reduce the time limit
within which the parties are required to agree upon the terms of sale.
In a probate setting a substantial time period may be desirable for tax and
administrative reasons; but when a shareholder loses his license, there
should be a desire on the part of all of the parties to sever the relationship
as promptly as possible.
F. One Shareholder Associations
The limitations imposed upon the identify of the transferee"1 7 by most
professional association and professional corporation statutes, raise a par-
ticularly difficult problem for the one shareholder corporation. What
happens to an Ohio professional association when its only shareholder
dies? One might conclude that it must be dissolved.1 " If this is so, and
at least one state" 9 specifically requires this result, then it would seem
that a one shareholder Ohio professional association would not have the
corporate characteristic of "continuity of life" even as that characteristic is
defined in the portion of the Regulations applied to non-professional cor-
porations.120 Moreover, depending upon the size of the organization and
of its board of directors, it may or may not have the other corporate char-
acteristics of centralized management, limited liability, and free transfer-
ability of interest.121
The extreme example of a professional association which would seem
not to meet even the non-professional corporation Regulations would be a
medical corporation which has one shareholder and one director, both the
same person, 12 2 and no other professional employees. Such a professional
association may not be treated as a corporation for tax purposes even if
"lrSee, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (H) (Page Supp. 1968).
116 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 274.095 (Supp. 1968).
117 See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.07 (Page 1964).
118There are also a number of other possibilities. The executor might be authorized to
amend the articles of incorporation to convert the professional association into a general corpora-
tion. Alternatively, the professional association might simply be required to suspend its pro-
fessiona activities until such time as the shares are transfered to a licensed person. See, Vesely,
supra note 43, at 201.
"9 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.095 (3) (Supp. 1968).
120 Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(b) (1965).
1-1 Cf., B. Bittker, note 6 supra, at 440.
2 This assumes that substitute Senate Bill No. 158 is adopted.
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the Treasury Department withdraws its professional corporation Regula-
tions. 1 23
Aside from the federal income tax considerations, the statute's silence
as to the consequence of the death of a sole shareholder presents a sub-
stantive corporate problem which should be solved. One way to solve
this problem is to authorize the personal representative of the deceased
shareholder to continue to hold the shares for a limited period of time as
a "passive investor" and to elect licensed professional persons as directors.
The personal representative would then be permitted to sell the shares to
a licensed professional during a given period of time or, if no such sale
was made, to dissolve the association. In addition to solving a substantive
corporate problem, this might also provide at least a modified form of
continuity of life for income tax purposes.
G. Enforcement Policy
There is no explicit procedure established in the professional associa-
tion statute for enforcing the annual report requirement. Since it is, or at
least could be, the key to carrying out the legislative policy of regulating
the qualification of shareholders, the reporting requirement should be ex-
panded and made enforceable. It should be expanded by requiring a
certification that all of the persons required to be licensed are in fact
licensed. This would cover not only shareholders, but also directors and
those officers who are required to be licensed. Failure over an extended
period of time to comply with the reporting requirement should result in
loss of the corporate charter.
H. Voting Trusts and Proxies
The use of a voting trust by the shareholders of a professional corpora-
tion is prohibited or restricted in several states.2-4 While the voting trust
device is not mentioned in the Ohio statute, it appears that the restriction
placed on the identity of the transferee of shares1 5 has the effect of pre-
venting the use of a voting trust except when the trustee is a qualified
transferee.2 8
There is no such prohibition against granting a proxy to an unlicensed
person or even to a person who has lost his license, even though such use
of a proxy would be clearly contrary to the underlying legislative policy
expressed 'by the shareholder licensing requirement.
I2 Of course, if the rationale of the 6th Circuit prevails, then even such a one shareholder
professional association would be taxed as a corporation because of its status under local law.
O'Neill v. United States, ___ F.2d --- (6th Cir. 1969).
124 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-4911 (19--) (medical professional corporation).
12 OHIO REv. CODS ANN. § 1785.07 (Page 1964).
126 See, Z. Cavitch, note 100 supra, at 4.51 (1).
[Vol. 30
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
The statute should be amended to specifically prohibit the granting of
proxies to non-licensed persons and to make it dear that the transferee
limitations also apply to voting trustees.
V. CONCLUSION
For all of its limitations, the Ohio professional association statute still
represents a workable statute for professional persons who either agree on
all important matters or, more likely, intelligently employ buy-sell agree-
ments and use artfully-drawn articles of incorporation and codes of regu-
lation. The buy-sell agreement will solve most of the problems that
might otherwise arise upon the death, incompetency, or loss of license of a
shareholder. It should also cover other matters of shareholder concern,
such as transfers to outsiders. The qualification of directors and officers
and the manner in which proxies and voting trusts are employed can be
covered in the articles of incorporation or code of regulations.
Most of the problems associated with the limited purpose of a profes-
sional association will not arise. Many professional associations will not
accumulate any substantial funds. Even if they do accumulate funds, more
often than not no one will object to their investments. Furthermore,
the accumulated earnings penalty tax acts as a barrier to the substantial
accumulation of funds.127
While the statute may be workable under ideal circumstances, it is not
workable and presents substantial interpretive problems that will require
years of litigation if the parties do not properly plan the corporate organ-
ization and subsequently do not agree. Moreover, the legislative policy
of preventing unlicensed persons from providing professional services
may be circumvented in many circumstances because of loosely-drawn or
missing statutory language.
The statutory changes required to remedy this situation are easy to
visualize. With only a few exceptions, the corrective language is con-
tained in the statutes of one or more of the surrounding states.
To pass up this opportunity to remedy a statute which may soon be-
come a major corporate statute, would be a disservice to the professions,
to the public, and to the Bar.
=.7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531. See, Alexander, Some Tax Problems of a Professional
Association, 13 WESrERN RESERVE L. REV. 212, 218-19 (1962).
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